Counterfeit Aircraft Parts: Detect, Quarantine, Document

Parts arrive at your receiving dock every day. Aircraft may be waiting. Teams work fast. Certificates and trace documents can be spread across emails, shared drives, and paper folders. Under AOG pressure, a shipment can look “good enough” until it’s already in use.

This guide outlines a simple workflow to reduce counterfeit aircraft parts risk. It covers receiving checks, quarantine, disposition, and audit-ready records. The goal is consistency: the same checks, the same triggers, and the same documentation—every time, regardless of supplier or urgency.

Main Takeaways

• Documentation fraud—not physical counterfeiting—is the main way suspect parts get in.
• Receiving must verify release certificates, trace documents, and PO alignment before stock acceptance.
• Quarantine needs physical segregation, inventory holds that block work orders, and chain-of-custody logging.
• Disposition needs clear pathways (return, scrap, test) and defined decision owners.
• Exposure analysis depends on part-to-cert-to-PO-to-work-order linkage so alerts can be investigated fast.

Counterfeit vs. Unapproved vs. SUP

Teams use these terms differently. Use the definitions below to make receiving and quarantine decisions consistent.

• Counterfeit: Deliberate falsification of identity, origin, or certification.
• Unapproved: No valid approval basis (missing docs, expired limits, improper repair, or unknown provenance).
• SUP: Suspected unapproved part (not a final finding).
• Rule: If you can't prove approval and traceability, quarantine until disposition is documented.

How Counterfeit Aircraft Parts Enter the Supply Chain

Most suspect-part exposure starts upstream of the hangar floor—often during sourcing and receiving, when the operation is under schedule pressure and records are fragmented. It's driven by a few repeatable mechanisms that slip past receiving when teams are rushed or records are fragmented.

• Documents can be faked. Forged 8130-3s and altered repair records can make parts look legitimate. Changed serials can hide the true origin (see UK Serious Fraud Office conviction details). 
• Supply pressure increases exposure. When lead times stretch and aircraft are waiting, teams rely more on urgent buys and secondary channels.
• Brokers and distributors can be a weak link. Not because they are always unreliable, but because chain-of-custody and documentation standards vary—and documentation fraud can be hard to spot when teams are rushed.
• Longer turnaround times add more pressure. About 75% of MRO survey respondents reported worse engine and APU turnaround times. Over half expect supply-chain issues for at least 18 more months (per Oliver Wyman MRO supply and labor pressure survey findings). That pushes teams to expedite sourcing and receiving decisions, which increases the chance that documentation gaps slip through.
• Receiving checks can miss gaps. PO, certificate, and trace checks may vary by shift or base. That lets parts enter "serviceable" stock without proof.
• Alerts can arrive late. UPNs and OEM/authority alerts may flag suppliers or part ranges after parts are already in circulation. Apply the same checks to every supplier (see the FAA Unapproved Parts Notifications portal).

Many industry alerts tied to suspect parts point back to the same root cause: documentation that looked valid until it was cross-checked.

Receiving Inspection Controls

Receiving inspection is your first hard control. It combines physical checks, document checks, and PO matching. If anything fails, the part triggers quarantine.

Quick Physical Checks at Receipt

Use a short, repeatable check set:

• Packaging integrity and signs of tampering/repackaging
• Maker labels and part markings consistent with the PO and packing slip
• Serial/lot/batch codes consistent across the part and paperwork
• Condition consistent with stated history (corrosion, abnormal wear, mismatched hardware)

Document Checks Before Stock Acceptance

Verify documentation before any part becomes "serviceable":

• Confirm the release certificate is present (e.g., FAA 8130-3 or EASA Form 1, as applicable).
• Match part number and serial number to the certificate, PO, and packing slip.
• Confirm the issuing organization and signatory authority align with your acceptance requirements.
• Cross-check trace documents with the part’s history. Confirm repairs, custody chain, and back-to-birth records when required.
• If documents are missing, inconsistent, or unverifiable: no documentation, no stock.

Not every item arrives with the same level of paperwork. Some consumables and some electronic parts may come with a Certificate of Conformity (CoC) instead of an authorized release form. CoCs can be easier to fake or change. If the paperwork is weaker, raise your standards. Verify the supplier, capture more evidence at receipt, and quarantine the part if you can’t prove where it came from.

Use these pass/fail triggers to standardize receiving decisions across stores and QA:

• Packaging/labels mismatch → quarantine + photo
• Marking mismatch → quarantine
• Missing/invalid release cert → quarantine
• Trace gaps/inconsistency → quarantine + QA escalation
• PO/packing slip mismatch → hold + supplier clarification

Quarantine Controls

Quarantine keeps suspect parts out of work orders. It gives your team time to check documents and decide what to do next. Notify QA/Compliance and the DOM when a quarantine is opened for suspected unapproved or counterfeit indicators.

Segregate and Block Issuing

Keep serviceable, unserviceable, and quarantine locations and statuses separate to prevent accidental issue.

• Segregate parts in a restricted-access quarantine area (separate from serviceable/unserviceable).
• Tag each item with: date quarantined, reason code, PN/SN, originating PO, and initiator.
• Apply an inventory status hold (e.g., "Quarantine/Hold") so the part cannot be issued to work orders.

Capture Evidence and Chain of Custody

Capture evidence once and link it to the case record:

• Photos: markings/data plate, packaging, condition at receipt
• Document images: release certificate and trace documents
• Chain of custody: who moved/accessed the part and when
• Decision log: investigation notes, approvals, timestamps

Do not return original documents, repackage the part, or relabel it until the final decision is approved and documented.

Counterfeit Part Disposition and Reporting

Disposition is where risk increases. Teams get exposed when roles are unclear or decisions are not documented.

This table clarifies who owns each decision point from receiving through disposition.

Who Decides What

Disposition Paths: Return, Scrap, or Test

• Return to vendor: Use when documentation cannot be verified and fraud is not suspected. Require complete trace documentation or accept return per terms.
• Scrap (controlled destruction): Use when confirmed unapproved/counterfeit. Document destruction (photos + witness).
• Testing/inspection: Use when authenticity is unclear and value is high. Use an accredited lab or OEM inspection service; attach results to the case file.

If a suspect part is confirmed, place the supplier on hold pending QA review and document corrective actions before future buys.

Stop-Install Triggers

Receiving issues, alert matches (UPN/OEM), serial or document mismatches, or trace gaps should trigger a stop-install hold. If you find a problem during installation, stop work right away. Quarantine the part and send it to QA and the DOM for a decision. Only the DOM can remove the stop-install hold. Record the reason and the time.

When to File FAA Form 8120-11

In recent enforcement cases, the part often did not look fake. The bigger problem was missing or weak records. Teams did not verify documents and trace history the same way every time. They also could not prove they did proper checks.

Use FAA Form 8120-11 to report suspected unapproved parts, following your SOP and FAA guidance. Include the release certificate, photos, trace documents, and your quarantine log. Keep proof of submission.

If the issue is a correctable documentation gap and there are no fraud indicators, resolve it with the supplier per SOP before filing.

The table below breaks down the evidence items for FAA submission. It also covers what to retain internally.

FAA Submission and Internal Evidence Package

Keep the case file for as long as your authority and company policy require. Only close it after you document the final decision and any reports you filed.

Follow your authority and company SOPs when you report or dispose of suspect parts (FAA, EASA, UK CAA, Transport Canada, or others).

Penalty Context and Audit Exposure

Alerts can trigger fast response work. You need to find affected parts quickly and show what actions you took.

• Search inventory (serviceable, quarantine, unserviceable) by PN/SN/range and supplier.
• Search work order history for possible installations; identify aircraft and assemblies involved.
• Document findings and actions (inspect, remove, quarantine, continue with rationale).
• Retain the alert and record your search terms and filters—proving a negative matters.

If you operate internationally, treat unusual routing, third-party intermediaries, or inconsistent supplier details as a documentation risk flag. Apply the same verification and quarantine triggers.

Templates to Standardize in Your QMS

Use templates to drive consistency. Keep them short, repeatable, and tied to your system of record.

Receiving Checklist Fields

• Date received, PO, supplier, PN, SN/lot/batch
• Packaging/label condition and discrepancy notes
• Release certificate type + issuer/signatory fields
• Trace doc completeness + discrepancy notes
• Decision: accept / quarantine / return + inspector name/date

Quarantine Tag Fields

• QUARANTINE – DO NOT USE
• Date, reason code, PN/SN, originating PO
• Initiator name/contact, disposition pending by (role)

SUP Intake Log Fields

• Date identified, PN/SN, supplier, PO
• Reason (doc gap / anomaly / alert match)
• Location + custody reference
• Submission date/method (if filed), disposition + approver

Quarterly Audit Drill

Run these three questions quarterly:

• Can you retrieve a serialized part's release certificate in 5 minutes?
• Can you run a where-used search for a PN installed in the last 12 months?
• Can you show quarantine holds prevented issuing during an AOG scramble?

Centralize Parts Traceability with SOMA Software

Most suspect-part problems don't show up during an inspection. They show up later. The paperwork is missing, or no one can prove what happened. That's why this guide focuses on simple controls: check documents at receiving, quarantine anything unsure, and record every decision.

SOMA Software helps you keep those records in one place. It links inventory items to certificates, purchase orders, and work orders. That makes it easier to block quarantined parts, pull evidence fast, and run a where-used search when an alert hits.

Get a Quote to see how SOMA Software supports traceability from receipt to installation.

FAQs about counterfeit aircraft parts

What's the difference between a counterfeit part and an unapproved part when deciding whether to quarantine?

Quarantine both. Counterfeit implies deliberate falsification; unapproved is broader, including missing/expired/unknown provenance.

Should I quarantine a part if the 8130-3 looks legitimate but the supplier is new?

Yes, if you can't independently validate issuer authority and document-to-part match. Unverifiable documentation is a quarantine trigger.

How do I handle a serial mismatch between the PO and the release certificate?

Quarantine immediately and require corrective documentation. Treat mismatches as high-risk until resolved.

When should I escalate a receiving discrepancy to the FAA instead of returning it?

File a report if you suspect deliberate falsification. Also file if the part matches an active alert. If the supplier can't fix the documentation and the issue may affect other parts, escalate it to the FAA.

What if a part arrives with no paperwork during an AOG?

Do not install. Expedite documentation or alternate sourcing, or defer per MEL/operational procedures where applicable.